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NOTES
POST CoNVICTIoN GuILTY PLEA WITHDRAwALS
Thirteen years after being convicted for armed robbery and
murder, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the convictions
and withdraw his guilty pleas. Prior to a hearing on the motion,
the defendant wrote to the judge who had received the original
pleas, admitting he had killed one of the victims. On rehearing,
the Missouri supreme court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to permit withdrawal of the plea. The court
held that defendant's post-conviction admission of guilt to the
trial judge was imnmterial to the grant of his motion to with-

draw an involuntary plea of guilty. State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d
497 (Mo. 1972).
A plea of guilty is generally construed as a waiver of all
nonjurisdictional defects;2 it constitutes a relinquishment of the
right to a jury trial,3 the right of confrontation, 4 and the privilege
against self-incrimination.5 Because this waiver involves federal
constitutional rights, due process requires that the plea be both
voluntary and intelligent.6
1. On original hearing, the Missouri supreme court concluded that the
trial court erroneously failed to determine whether the pleas were voluntarily and understandingly made in accordance with Mo. Rzv STAT. 42.103
(1959), which provides in part: "The court . . . shall not accept the plea
without first determining that the plea Is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge . . . ." The other pleas were allowed
to be withdrawn, but the court withheld judgment on the plea involving the
post-conviction admission, pending a lower court hearing. The supreme
court there took the position that if the confession or admission were
voluntary, no injustice would result by denying the defendant's motion
irrespective of the defective plea. State v. Reese, 457 SW.2d 713 (Mo. 1970).
2. Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Beto,
453 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972); McDonald v. United States, 437 F.2d 1251 (5th
Cir. 1971); People v. Jury, 252 Mich. 488, 233 N.W. 389 (1930). But see Winters
v. Cook, 466 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
5. U.S. CONST, amend. V; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The following cases have
expressly observed that the "voluntariness" of the plea is the critical
factor in determining its validity and that due process mandates that the
plea be knowingly and understandingly made: Alford v. North Carolina,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 45 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 580 (1968); Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy,
350 U.S. 116 (1956); Schnautz v. Beto, 416 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1969); Leonard v.
United States, 231 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Bresnock
v. Rundle, 300 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1969). D. NEWMAN, THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 8 (1966): "While the accurate separa[439]
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There is conflicting judicial authority with respect to the
propriety of considering guilt or innocence at a post-conviction
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The United
States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this issue. It
appears that a majority of jurisdictions7 follow the reasoning of
Kerscheval v. United States,8 where the Supreme Court stated in
dictum: "[T]he court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have
been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. Such an application does not involve any question of
guilt or innocence."9 (Emphasis added.) The cases supporting
this view take the position that the issue is not the movant's
guilt or innocence, but whether the guilty plea was "voluntarily,
advisedly, intentionally and understandingly entered . . .or attributable to force, fraud, fear, ignorance, inadvertence or mistake." 0
tion of the guilty from the innocent is obviously a major objective of
adjudication by trial or by plea, there is also increasing concern, particularly
by appellate judges, over aspects of the guilty plea process not directly
related to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For example, it is
generally required that the person pleading guilty do so only with full
understanding of the consequences." "Fairness of the process is no less an
objective in guilty plea cases than in cases which are tried, but dimensions
and the significance of fair procedures in the guilty plea process has
received less attention than the matter of fair trial." Id. at 206. The Supreme
Court in Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970), held that a guilty
plea found to have been knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made
is valid, despite the defendant's contention of innocence at the time it is
received. The Court reiterated that the standard for determining the validity
of a guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."
For an excellent article concerning the standards pertaining to the acceptance of a guilty plea see Note, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289. See also Note, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1955); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); Note, 64
YALE L.J. 590 (1955).

7. United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970); Heideman v.
United States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d
241 (3d Cir. 1959); Woodring v. United States, 248 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1957);
Leonard v. United States, 231 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1956); Richardson v. United
States, 217 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1954); Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d
690 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953); United States v. Lias,
173 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1949); Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515 (9th Cir.
1948); Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1944). See also Facion
v. State, 258 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1972); State v. Dunham, 149 La. 1013, 90 So. 387
(1922); Commonwealth v. Crapo, 212 Mass. 209, 98 N.E. 702 (1912).
8. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
9. Id. at 224.
10. Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953). The rationale of many of the cases displays a
concern for fairness and the recognition that a guilty plea serves to waive
numerous valuable rights. As stated by the Fifth Circuit: "The right to
trial by jury being one of the most valuable and most highly cherished
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the courts have been understandably
slow in holding an accused to an election to waive the right and enter a
plea of guilty . . . . The fact that the defendant did not show that he had
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On the other hand, there is authority for the position that a
defendant, upon filing his motion to withdraw, must at least
allege that he is innocent of the charge." A leading opinion
supporting this view is that of Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Paglia: "A defendant is not entitled to gamble on the
outcome of a trial . . . [a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
cannot be granted where it is accompanied by the defendant's
admission of all the facts on which his guilt depends.' 1 2 (Emphasis added.) A few early cases espoused an even more stringent
requirement, asserting, inter alia, that before a defendant could
be granted relief, it had to appear that a retrial would result in
a judgment different from the one sought to be vacated.'
In holding a defendant's admitted guilt immaterial to the
grant of his post-conviction motion to withdraw an involuntary
guilty plea, the instant case extended the Kerscheval rationale
to its logical conclusion. 14 The Reese majority opinion is based
a defense to the charge or the fact that he might, or probably would, be found
guilty by a jury is not significant here.
...Leonard v. United States, 231
F.2d 588, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1956). Of significance is a recent article by Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit who takes the minority postion that postconviction relief should be unavailable unless, "the prisoner supplements
his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence." One of the
few exceptions Judge Friendly makes to his proposition, however, is a
conviction resulting from an involuntary plea of guilty. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant1 Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142, 152 (1971). In addition, the standard for guilty plea withdrawals
put forward by the American Bar Association includes the proviso: "The
defendant may move for withdrawal of his plea without alleging that he
is innocent of the charge to which the plea has been entered." ABA Project
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas
of Guilty F. 2.1 (a) (iii) (App. Draft 1968).
11. United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
907 (1964); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 957 (1963); United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951);
Cantwell v. United States, 163 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1947); Welton v. United
States, 313 F. Supp, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Cooper, 222 F.
Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1963); State v. Nichols, 167 Kan. 565, 207 P.2d 469 (1949);
People v. Fargo, 178 N.W.2d 137 (Mich. App. 1970); Langston v. State, 245
So.2d 579 (Miss. 1971). But see Bishop v. United States, 349 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
12. 190 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1951).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir. 1948),
and cases cited therein.
14. The Reese majority emphasized that all defendants are entitled to
certain fundamental protections-the right to a jury trial and the presumption of innocence. An involuntary plea is a deprivation of these protections.
By drawing an analogy to the "fairness" approach used to determine the
voluntary character of a confession In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961), the majority concluded that when a defendant, whether guilty or
innocent, is deprived of these rights, the plea must be set aside. The court
cited Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to support its conclusion
"that the key issue is whether the plea is voluntarily and understandingly
made." 481 S.W.2d at 500.
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on the principle that the appropriate place to determine guilt or
innocence is a trial on the merits. The dissent took the position
advocated by Judge Hand that a defendant's admission of guilt,
subsequent to his conviction, precludes a withdrawal of the
plea. The dissent opined that the admission rendered it unnecessary to go to the time and expense of a trial to ascertain what
had already been conceded in writing by the defendant.
Although Reese was decided under Missouri law, 15 the issue
is broader, involving as well a matter of federal constitutional
dimension. Admitting that an involuntary guilty plea violates
due process in that it deprives a defendant of his constitutional
rights, can the fact that the defendant admits his guilt serve to
cure the violation? A plea of guilty is more than a confession
or admission, since the guilty plea is sufficient in itself for a conviction. 1e One pleading guilty is surrounded by numerous safe15. The majority pointed out that the test under Missouri law for
granting a post-conviction motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is whether
"manifest injustice" has occurred. The majority explicitly held that "'manifest Injustice' or its absence, should not be equated with ultimate guilt
or Innocence ...." 481 S.W.2d at 499. The court concluded that a guilty
plea which is involuntary or is given without proper understanding is a
"manifest injustice" that must be corrected. See FE. R. CRiM. P. 32(b). The
Reese dissent argued that "manifest injustice" could not result where a
defendant confesses his guilt on the one hand and seeks to withdraw his
plea on the other. See particularly the dissenting opinion of Judge Henley,
481 S.W.2d at 503.
16. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). It Is a constitutional mandate,
governed by federal standards that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent.
See note 6 supra. A plea which fails to meet this test is void on due process
grounds. Since a guilty plea is itself a sufficient basis for a conviction, an
invalid plea is, in effect, an invalid conviction open to collateral attack.
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). To correct this situation, there must
be a valid judgment rendered or the imprisoned individual set at liberty.
The recognized cure for an invalid conviction is a conviction based on a
valid plea of guilty or a trial on the merits. Since a confession is neither a
guilty plea nor, a fortiori, a trial on the merits, it cannot serve to cure the
conviction. Thus, in the author's opinion, a meritorious claim by a defendant
that his conviction was the product of an involuntary or unintelligent plea
of guilty necessitates vacating the conviction and permitting a withdrawal,
notwithstanding the likelihood of the defendant's guilt. See Dukes v. Warden,
406 U.S. 250 (1972). See also the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall in
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971). As the Court reaffirmed in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), "the plea is more than an
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of
conviction may be entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial
before a jury or judge." Moreover, a recent decision by the Fifth Circuit
furthers the proposition that the guilt of the defendant is of no significance
in determining the validity of a guilty plea. The Court held that irrespective
of a subsequent acquittal of the only other co-conspirator, defendant's voluntary plea of guilty to the conspiracy charge was not thereby vitiated. United
States v. Strother, 458 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972).
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guards which the Supreme Court held in Boykin v. Alabama'7
were constitutionally required to assure the exercise of a voluntary and intelligent choice. Moreover, the plea of guilty is entered in an atmosphere of calm, decorum, and dignity, and must
be free of influences that may taint the constitutional waiver.
Because the extra-judicial confession or admission is made in
the absence of such protections, the "indicia of reliability" is
significantly reduced. Even if it be assumed that the confession
is reliable, it is not certain that the accused will be convicted
at trial. A confession or admission is merely evidence; it is not
tantamount to conviction. The critical issue is that an individual
who pleads guilty involuntarily has been deprived of his option
to trial by jury where he may have been adjudged innocent.
Viewing the guilty plea in this light, it is difficult, to avoid the
Reese conclusion that a subsequent confession cannot breathe
new life into an otherwise void plea of guilty, and that an individual aggrieved by an involuntary plea should be permitted to
regain his position status quo, ante.'s
Finally, it does not appear that an involuntary guilty plea
should be considered "harmless error" unless the state could
prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that, irrespective of the constitutional violation, a plea of guilty would still have been tendered and the same penalty imposed'l-a seemingly impossible
task.
T. Victor Jackson

DUTY-RISK-AN

ALTERNATIVE TO PROXIMATE CAUSE?

After completing roofing repairs, defendant's employees left
a ladder leaning against a house. Subsequently, an unknown third
party moved the ladder and laid it flat on the ground. Plaintiff,
17. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that a
guilty plea must be fully supported on the court record by an affirmative
showing that it was voluntarily and intelligently made. In a recent decision
the Louisiana supreme court followed the mandate of Boykin and established

guidelines to be used in accepting a plea. State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson,
260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971). But see State ex rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson,
262 La. 185, 262 So.2d 786 (1972).
18. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);

Kerscheval v.

United

States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). As has been stated: "The judgment and sentence
which followed a plea of guilty are based solely upon the plea." Busby v.
Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1966). (Emphasis added.)
19. Cf. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

